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Abstract
This paper elaborates on the theoretical and methodological fundamentals of a trad-
able green certificates system to foster renewable energy development in Ukraine. It 
proposes a management mechanism premised on the classical market model of trad-
able green certificates aiming at increasing the share of electricity from renewable 
energy sources in the country’s energy mix. Organizational stages of the mechanism 
formation at the national level and a methodological approach to assess green electric-
ity generation cost are developed. The modeling has shown that the annual increase in 
the cap for green electricity consumption by 1% will raise the electricity tariff by 3%, 
which is not a significant financial burden for consumers. The proposed changes in 
the tradable green certificates system can be an effective management tool to achieve 
the required amount of electricity from renewable energy sources in the country’s to-
tal electricity consumption and to foster the development of the Ukrainian renewable 
energy sector.
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INTRODUCTION 
The development of a technologically advanced and internationally 
competitive economy in Ukraine is contingent on the effective man-
agement of the country’s energy sector, which at present requires sig-
nificant improvement. Such improvement can be achieved via increas-
ing energy efficiency and energy independence of the national econo-
my (Sineviciene et al., 2018; Sotnyk, 2016), as well through decreasing 
the environmental and public health impacts of the energy sector with 
the help of innovation management focused on renewable energy (RE) 
deployment (Kubatko & Kubatko, 2017, 2019). 
Currently, despite the gradual reduction of electricity generation cost 
from renewable energy sources (RES), almost all existing RE technolo-
gies in Ukraine are subsidized and cannot develop without governmen-
tal support. Therefore, successful development of the RE sector depends 
on the selection of economic support mechanisms (Papież et al., 2018). 
It should be noted that the number of policy mechanisms aimed at 
promoting electricity generation from RES have been implemented in 
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Ukraine since 2009 (Kurbatova, 2018). During 2009–2019, the regulatory framework governing the 
RE sector was constantly improved. In particular, a number of legal initiatives were introduced to im-
prove economic incentives, mostly in the part of the feed-in tariff (Law of Ukraine, 1997). However, 
despite these efforts, the share of RES in the total national electricity consumption remains extreme-
ly low reaching only 1.9% at the end of 2018 (NCSREPU, 2019). The rest of the electricity demand in 
the country is met with fossil fuel-fired generation, 50% of which is imported (NCSREPU, 2019). This 
calls for further government intervention in the energy sector, particularly in optimizing the existing 
market-based mechanisms, to begin a significant substitution of the conventional electricity generation 
technologies with RES. 
One of the disadvantages of the current set of incentives for RE support in Ukraine is the overreliance 
on the feed-in tariff (FIT). This policy mechanism aimed at encouraging RE supply is not sufficient-
ly aided by mechanisms that target increasing demand for RE resulting in incoherent market signals. 
Meanwhile, there are numerous examples globally of demand-centric incentives that work in unison 
with supply-centric mechanisms such as Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) in the United States. An 
RPS requires an electric utility operating in this U.S. state to supply a set percentage of electricity from 
renewable sources (National, 2019). These mechanisms have been a major driver behind RE prolifera-
tion in individual states despite the resistance from the federal government and some electric utili-
ties (Cavallaro et al., 2017). Drawing upon the international experience of utilizing policy mechanisms 
aimed at increasing demand for RE, in this study, a theoretical and methodological foundation for a 
management mechanism for the RE deployment was developed based on a tradable green certificates 
system (TGCS) and to justify its deployment at the national level to revitalize an RE market in Ukraine.
1. LITERATURE REVIEW
A TGCS is an economic mechanism to promote RE 
development that is based on the establishment of 
a minimum mandatory requirement for consump-
tion of electricity from RES. A typical TGCS mar-
ket model is premised on the following two key fea-
tures. First, it separates physical flow of green elec-
tricity from its environmental benefits reflected in 
green certificates (GСs) cost. It allows using GСs 
as a tool to achieve relevant goals in various sup-
port schemes for RE development. Second, it brings 
market competition to green electricity generation 
or consumption in order to form an optimal price 
for electricity from RES on the basis of demand and 
supply interaction (Schaeffer et al., 1999).
It should be noted that TGCS-based approaches 
have been successfully adopted in many devel-
oped countries such as the United States, Australia, 
Japan, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom and others (REN21, 2017). 
Adopting a TGCS to a particular national jurisdic-
tion requires a number of adjustments to fit the 
specific features of a national electricity market, 
national and sub-national policy goals, and the 
realities of a national legal and regulatory regime.
A key challenge of implementing a TGCS is to 
choose the most suitable entities required to gen-
erate or consume electricity from RES and to pur-
chase GСs. As the international experience shows, 
such a responsibility can be imposed on any par-
ticipant of the electricity market. In Australia, na-
tional wholesale electricity markets bear the re-
sponsibility whereas in the United Kingdom and 
Romania it is energy supply companies and in 
Sweden and Denmark it is end consumers (Nilsson 
& Sundqvist, 2007). Other significant differences 
related to the RES types and to which a TGCS is 
extended include the GC price formation (Hanne, 
2010), the interplay of several national electricity 
markets with featuring TGCS, and peculiarities of 
additional support schemes based on the GСs use 
(NREL, 2014). 
A GC is a commercial product, which represents 
the environmental value of electricity from RES 
(Holt & Bird, 2005). A GC is given to a producer of 
green electricity in exchange for certain amount 
of the generated electricity. Correspondingly, it 
proves that a certain amount of renewable elec-
tricity was generated and consumed when it was 
acquired by an economic entity subject to a TGCS 
requirement.
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The GC price depends on the average mar-
ket price for conventional electricity and cost 
of electricity generation from RES. One of a 
TGCS disadvantages is the complexity of price 
formation for electricity generated from differ-
ent types of RES. At any moment, the GC price 
must meet the price of electricity generated 
from the most expensive RES within a TGCS 
to cover the cost for electricity generation from 
all included RES. An average price for electric-
ity based on all RES covered by a TGCS results 
in the deployment of the least expensive options 
because of the incentive to maximize profits. At 
the same time, because the GC price covers the 
cost of the most expensive RES, lower-cost RES 
enjoy windfall profits. 
The degree of government intervention in the 
process of the GС price formation is also of high 
importance. Currently, there are two main ap-
proaches employed by states in this regard. First, 
it is allowing market self-regulation of price 
based on the supply and demand for green elec-
tricity for as long as the competition remains free 
of restrains. In this case, a TGCS aims at achiev-
ing a set goal (required amount of electricity gen-
erated from RES) at any price (Lukosevicius & 
Werring, 2011). Under this approach, a TGCS op-
erates with price risks because in case of GСs def-
icit or surplus on the market, their cost can lead 
to economically unjustified price. Second, it is a 
government that determines GC minimum and 
maximum price caps (Lukosevicius & Werring, 
2011). The price “floor” (P
min
) is used to protect 
producers from the low price of electricity, which 
can jeopardize return on the investment. The 
price ceiling (P
max
) is used to protect end consum-
ers from unreasonably high price of electricity. 
Under this approach, the GС price is calculated 
on the basis of green electricity demand and sup-





(Imbrescu & Codruta, 2013). 
If economic entities, which are obligated to pur-
chase GC, are not able to fulfill the requirement 
completely, they must pay a fine for every unpur-
chased GC established by the government, usual-
ly in the amount which exceeds the set GC price. 
Generally, GCs trade occurs at a specialized mar-
ket (power exchange) requiring creation of a sep-
arate market (Abolhosseini & Heshmati, 2014).
2. LAYING A FOUNDATION 
FOR A TGCS IN UKRAINE 
The first price formation approach described 
above requires a developed RE market. Because 
such market is still being developed in Ukraine 
and the share of electricity generated from RES re-
mains low, the first approach appears to be unsuit-
able. However, it is reasonable to form a modified 
TGCS generally premised on the second approach 
and featuring both ordinary GCs and the credit 
GCs. At present, this policy mechanism is likely 
to create a reliable base and optimal conditions 
for dynamic development of the Ukrainian RE 
sector. As a TGCS develops and the national RE 
sector gains prominence, a TGCS can begin mov-
ing away from direct government intervention to-
wards classic market. 
The proposed TGCS is a mechanism to stimu-
late generation and consumption of electricity 
from RES premised on the requirement (quota) 
to purchase a set amount of green electricity that 
is imposed on the Ukrainian energy supply com-
panies. The requirement is set proportionally to 
the amount of electricity sold to end consumers 
by each supply company. The fulfillment of the 
imposed obligation is confirmed by the fact of 
possession of the required number of GCs, which 
have been purchased according to the terms of a 
TGCS. 
Under the proposed TGCS, green electricity is 
sold at the national wholesale electricity market 
at the average market price. This price includes 
both the price for electricity generated based on 
all conventional energy generation technologies 
presented on the Ukrainian electricity market 
(fossil fuel-fired conventional power and com-
bined heat and power plants, nuclear power plants, 
and large hydropower plants) and the price of GCs, 
which will the help to offset extra RES-generated 
cost. Revenue from these two sources will not al-
so help achieve reasonable profit by owners of RE 
plants thereby creating a lasting incentive for RES 
growth. 
Some countries set a GC price based on average 
cost of all participating RE technologies (Devenyi 
& Mladenova, 2012). However, the current ar-
ticle proposes to follow another setting a GC 
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price for each type of participating RE technol-
ogy (Imbrescu & Codruta, 2013). Although this 
approach complicates the GC price calculation, 
it can provide fair pricing for electricity and for-
mation of the more competitive and diverse RES 
mix. It is recommended that the GC market in 
Ukraine should be a separate segment of the na-
tional wholesale electricity market, where GCs 
transactions take place based on agreements be-
tween producers of green electricity and energy 
supply companies.
For an effective introduction of a TGCS in Ukraine, 
it is necessary to do so via a number of organiza-
tional stages. Each of them is considered in more 
detail below:
1. Creation of the Department of RE 
Development (DRED) within the National 
Commission for State Regulation of Energy 
and Public Utilities (NCSREPU) and giving it 
the authority to monitor and control a TGCS.
2. Accreditation of RE generating capacities. 
Accreditation is aimed at identification 
and evaluation of RE plants eligible to re-
ceive GCs. It is proposed to include solar, 
wind, biomass (solid biomass, landfill bio-
gas, and agriculture biogas) and small hydro 
(with total installed capacity up to 10 МW) 
facilities. 
3. Setting the annual requirement (quota) for 
green electricity consumption. DRED of 
NCSREPU calculates predictable indicators 
of green electricity share in the total electrici-
ty mix for the reporting year based on the es-
tablished long-term goals to increase the RES 
share in the total electricity consumption and 
tracks the dynamics of RE development indi-
cators. This serves as the basis for the require-
ment (quota) for renewable electricity con-
sumption for each year.
4. Identification of all economic entities required 
to consume green electricity and purchase 
GCs. All electricity consumers receive a cer-
tain share of green electricity, which is reflect-
ed in their electricity bills. All energy supply 
companies that purchase wholesale electricity 
are required to buy GCs.
5. Formation of a single register and an account-
ing system for a TGCS. DRED forms and 
keeps a single electronic register that keeps 
track of all RE generation facilities and their 
owners and operators, as well as all econom-
ic entities obliged to purchase GCs. These 
accounts are necessary not only to facilitate 
GCs circulation among the economic entities 
involved in a TGCS but also to report to the 
NCSREPU regarding compliance with TGCS 
requirements.
6. Collecting information about the amount of 
electricity generated from RES. On a month-
ly basis, energy supply companies provide the 
NCSREPU with the information about the 
electricity from RES and supplied to consum-
ers connected via the grid within their service 
area (license authority).
7. Issuance of GCs. The NCSREPU facilitates 
GCs issuance in the electronic form. GCs va-
lidity period is one year.
8. GC transfers. Based on the energy supply com-
panies’ data in the beginning of each month, 
the NCSREPU transfers the appropriate num-
ber of GCs to the generating companies for 
the green electricity generated and supplied to 
the grid in the previous month. 
9. GC purchase requirement. Energy supply 
companies, which are required to purchase 
renewable electricity, must purchase the cor-
responding number of GCs to satisfy the re-
quirement for the set year. 
10. Purchase and sale of GCs. As mentioned above, 
purchase and sale of GCs must be carried out 
under contracts between eligible electricity 
producers and participating energy supply 
companies at the centralized GC market. 
11. Fulfillment of obligations to purchase GCs. 
End consumers have to pay for electricity 
from RES reflected in their electricity bill on 
a monthly basis. Energy supply companies 
must meet their GC purchase requirements 
by the end of the reporting year. Until the 
end of the first quarter of each reporting year, 
the NCSREPU relies on the estimates that 
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are based on historic GC sales and renewable 
electricity supply to determine compliance 
with the TGCS requirements. Energy supply 
companies that are required to purchase GCs 
must transfer the appropriate number of GCs 
to a special account at the NCSREPU for their 
further repayment. If renewable electricity 
generated for the reporting year exceeds the 
required amount, a participating RE facility 
owner has the right to apply unrealized GCs 
in the next reporting period.
12. Penalties for non-compliance. Energy supply 
companies that are required to purchase GCs 
and have not fulfilled the requirement during 
the reporting year must pay a fine for every 
unpurchased certificate. 
According to the current Ukrainian legislation, 
the FIT-based support scheme for RE develop-
ment will remain until January 1, 2030. Because 
it is an established and working mechanism that 
involves a number of completed and forthcoming 
projects, it is not practicable to treat the proposed 
TGCS as its replacement. Rather, the current study 
sees the proposed TGCS complementing and aid-
ing the existing scheme to accelerate development 
of new RE capacities.
FIT with a TGCS, an additional obligation (to a 
TGCS requirement) is proposed, under which 
power supply companies will purchase the elec-
tricity sold by FIT-supported entities for subse-
quent resale to first-class-voltage consumers, who 
are the largest electricity users and enjoy elec-
tricity tariffs (rates) that are 20% lower than for 
the second-class-voltage consumers (NCSREPU, 
1998). According to the NCSREPU resolution 
(NCSREPU, 1998), the first-class-voltage consum-
ers include entities that:
• receive electricity from an energy supplier at 
the electricity sale point with 27.5 kW voltage 
level and higher;
• are connected to the power plants buses (ex-
cept for hydropower plants that suffer from 
intermittent output) and to the buses of pow-
er plants substations with 220 kW and higher 
voltage regardless of voltage degree at the elec-
tricity sale point;
• are industrial enterprises with an average 
monthly electricity consumption of 150 mil-
lion kWh for industrial applications regard-
less of voltage levels at the electricity sale point. 
First-class-voltage consumers include predomi-
nately industrial customers that are the largest 
emitters of the greenhouse gases, the polluter-
pays principle justifies the extra obligation. It is a 
viable incentive to reduce electricity consumption 
through improving energy efficiency and intro-
ducing demand side management, as well as in-
vesting in RE projects in order to obtain GCs to 
meet obligations under a TGCS. A significant im-
mediate financial burden on industrial consumers 
is not anticipated because the share of renewable 
electricity generated as part of the FIT scheme in 
Ukraine today is low. In addition, in 2016−2019, 
conventional electricity tariffs (rates) grew more 
than twice and they are planned to grow gradually 
in the future (NCSREPU, 2019). Thus, the extra 
obligation will not only help achieve environmen-
tal benefit but also provide a strong market signal 
for industrial facilities to wean off ever increasing-
ly expensive fossil fuels in favor of ever increasing-
ly cheap RE (Sovacool et al., 2014). Figure 1 sum-
marizes a TGCS foundation outlined above. 
As mentioned above, the proposed TGCS is based 
on circulation of both ordinary GCs and credit 
GCs. The main purpose behind GCs is to obtain 
extra financial resources by investors to develop 
new RE facilities. Given the infancy of the RE 
market in Ukraine, it is likely that the amount of 
electricity generated from RES by operating the 
existing RE plants will be insufficient to meet even 
a modest RE goal. Credit GCs provide a pay-it-for-
ward solution for the Ukrainian RE market infan-
cy, albeit a non-altruistic one.
Credit GCs take a form of securities with one-year 
maturing period. When they are sold and pur-
chased at the GC market, end consumers effec-
tively pay for non-generated electricity from RES. 
As a result, investors get an interest-free or a low 
interest rate loan to partially offset generally high 
capital cost of RE projects. 
DRED, the proposed agency charged with regu-
lating and oversight of the RE sector, announces 
a competitive tender of RE projects, the winners 
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of which can gain access to credit GCs financing. 
The selection process should take into account 
the current total installed RE capacity, price, pre-
ferred types of RES (on reliability and resilience 
grounds), spatial allocation of RE facilities and 
other factors. An investor enters into an agree-
ment with DRED about supporting its RE project 
via issuing a certain amount of the credit GCs. 
The agency issues credit GCs according to the av-
erage annual projected amount of electricity to be 
generated by this RE facility. This opens the door 
for power supply entities, which have obligations 
under a TGCS to meet them with the issued credit 
GCs. The transaction occurs under the same rules 
as in the case of ordinary GCs. The funds received 
from the credit GCs’ sale are transferred to the 
investor, which uses them to finance the new RE 
plant. After putting the RE plant into operation, 
its owner also issued ordinary GCs in proportion 
of the generated renewable electricity. Unlike with 
credit GC, these certificates must be repaid imme-
diately bypassing the GC market until their quan-
tity is equal to the amount of the credit GCs sold 
with the aim to finance the construction of the RE 
plant. 
It should be noted that the replacement of the cred-
it GCs by the ordinary ones is carried out based on 
the amount of electricity generated from RES (ac-
cording to their quantity) and is not based on the 
current GCs price. In other words, the government 
gives an investor the amount of green electricity in 
MWh in the form of funds received from selling 
a certain quantity of the credit GCs, so that after 
Figure 1. The wholesale and retail electricity markets operating scheme with combination  
of electricity sold by the feed-in tariff and a TGCS 








National Commission for State Regulation of Energy and Public Utilities
Electricity Financial flows
GCs circulation
Producers, who sell electricity 




Department of RE development
Electricity producers
Producers of conventional 
electricity
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putting the RE plant into operation, the investor 
can reimburse the government for said amount of 
electricity expressed in the quantity of the ordi-
nary GCs. Hence, credit GCs can be used as part 
of an RE projects financing package, and are not 
intended to covering all investment cost required 
for RE facility construction.
3. METHODS
In addition to laying a foundation of the proposed 
TGSC, it is important to form methodological ap-
proaches to assessment of electricity generation 
cost from different types of RES. Electricity gen-
eration cost from RES can be calculated on the ba-
sis of levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) method. 
Today LCOE is widely used for comparative analy-
sis of electricity generation cost for different energy 
technologies by a number of organizations such as 
the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2010), the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, 2015) 
and the International Renewable Energy Agency 
(IRENA, 2012). Germany, the Netherlands, Great 
Britain, and Spain use LCOE as a base to calculate 
national FITs for RE plants (Visser & Held, 2014). 
In order to get more precise results, Khatib (2010) 
recommends calculating LCOE for every country, 
since LCOE depends on specific conditions of RE 
projects development, such as financing costs, re-
source availability, and siting and permitting re-
quirements that vary greatly from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction.
In order to determine electricity generation cost 
from RES under the proposed TGCS, it is neces-
sary to take into account the following indicators: 
investment, operation and maintenance cost, fuel 
cost, decommissioning cost, amount of generated 
electricity and discount rate. 
According to the noted above, LCOE can be calcu-
lated as follows:





























where itE  – amount of electricity generated from 
i  type of RES in year ,t  МWh; iLCOE  – price for 
electricity generated from i  type of RES during 
the RE plant’s lifetime EUR/МWh; itI  – invest-
ment cost for the RE plant based on i  type of RES 
in year ,t  EUR/МWh; itQ M∈  – operation and 
maintenance cost for the RE plant based on i  type 
of RES in year ,t  EUR/МWh; itF  – fuel cost for 
the RE plant based on i  type of RES in year ,t  
EUR/МWh; itD  – decommissioning cost for the 
RE plant based on i  type of RES in year ,t  EUR/
МWh; t  – year of the project implementation; r  – 
discount rate; and n  – duration of the RE plant’s 
lifetime, years.
Given the fact that within a TGCS, the price of 
electricity from RES is divided into two constitu-
ents, namely price of conventional electricity and 
price of the GCs, it can be calculated according to 
the following formula:
,REi i CE GCiP LCOE P P= = +  (2)
where REiP  – price of electricity generated from i  
type of RES, EUR/MWh; CEP  – annual predict-
able average weighted market price of convention-
al electricity, EUR/MWh; GCiP  – price of GCs for 
electricity generated from i  type of RES, EUR/
MWh.
It is reasonable to calculate the annual average 
weighted market price of conventional electricity 
on the basis of the projected wholesale price at the 
Ukrainian wholesale electricity market. It should be 
noted that the amount of electricity generation from 
some RES types directly depends on weather condi-
tions. That is why both deficit and surplus of electric-
ity from RES can appear in the proper months of the 
year. The set average weighted price of convention-
al electricity allows minimizing fluctuations of the 
GCs price. It gives an opportunity for energy supply 
companies to cover the requirement (quota) during 
the reporting year under the same price terms. 
Having calculated the annual predictable average 
weighted market price for conventional electricity, 
the GC price can be determined according to the 
following formula: 
.GCi REi CEP P P= −  (3)
In order to simplify a GCs issuance, it is proposed 
to set a single GC price. Since various RE tech-
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nologies have different prime cost of electricity, it 
is reasonable to take GC cost for the cheapest RE 
technology as a single certificate price. The price 
for electricity based on various RE technologies 
can be regulated by issuing a varied number of 
GCs to producers for 1 МWh generated from dif-
ferent RES. It is reasonable to set the quantity of 
the GCs issued to producers that employ different 
RE technologies for 1 МWh of the cheapest tech-







where GGiQ  – the quantity of the GCs issued for 
producers according to the price for 1 МWh of 
electricity generated from i  type of RES, units/
МWh; GCLP  – GCs price for electricity generated 
on the basis of the cheapest RE technology pre-
sented on the RE market, EUR/МWh.
Thus, from producer’s position, the price of 1 
МWh of electricity generated from i  type of RES 
( )PRODiP  can be calculated as follows:
.PRODi REi CE GCL GGiP P P P Q= = + ⋅  (5)
In order to keep a single price for electricity for 
end consumers in Ukraine, calculating the GCs 
quantity, which must be purchased by energy sup-
ply companies, should be based on the project-
ed average weighted quantity of the GCs issued 
to producers according to the projected annual 
amount of renewable electricity.
The annual projected average weighted quantity 
of the GCs for 1 МWh ( ) ,WAQ  which will be in 
circulation in the reporting year according to the 
projected annual amount of electricity generated 
from RES by the operating RE facilities, is calcu-






















1WAQ  – annual predictable average weight-
ed quantity of the GCs, which will have been in 
circulation in the reporting year, calculated based 
on the projection of electricity generated from op-
erating RE plants, units/МWh; k  – number of RE 
technologies presented on the electricity market 
in the reporting year; yiQE  – predictable amount 
of electricity generated by operating RE plants in 
the reporting year, МWh/year; GGiQ  – number of 
certificates issued to producers according to the 
price of 1 МWh of electricity generated from i  
type of RES, units/МWh.
If the NCSREPU decides to issue credit GCs, the 
annual average weighted quantity of the GCs for 1 
МWh ( )2 ,WAQ  which will be in circulation in the 

























2WAQ  – annual predictable average weight-
ed quantity of the GCs, which will be in circula-
tion in the reporting year, calculated on the basis 
of electricity amount generated by the operating 
RE plants and accounting for the issued credit 
GCs, units/МWh; KGCyiQE  – amount of electric-
ity from RES (which is necessary to fulfill the an-
nual requirement) planned to cover by the credit 
GCs issued in the reporting year, МWh.
In order to calculate the number of the GCs pur-
chased by the participating energy supply compa-
nies that are obligated to purchase them according 
to the requirement (quota) ( ) ,GCN  the following 
formula is proposed: 
( )1 2 ,GC WAN QE Qα= ⋅ ⋅  (8)
where QE  – amount of electricity purchased 
by the energy supply companies at the national 
wholesale electricity market, МWh/year; α  – re-
quirement for renewable electricity consumption 
for the reporting year, part of one; ( )1 2WAQ  – an-
nual average weighted number of GCs that would 
have been in circulation in the reporting year, de-
pending on the selected variant ((1) to use or (2) 
not to use the credit GCs), units/МWh.
Sum, which must be paid by energy supply compa-
nies for certificates purchased according to the annu-
al requirement (quota) (P
ESC
) is calculated as follows:
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.ESC GC GCLP N P= ⋅  (9)
It should be noted that unfulfilled obligations to 
purchase GCs according to the annual require-
ment (quota) for renewable electricity consump-
tion in a TGCS result in a fine. The fine for the 
unpurchased GCs is paid as an extra percentage 
of the certificate cost for the electricity generated 
based on the cheapest RE technology presented on 
the RE market. It can be calculated as follows:
( ) ,GC GCF GCL fF N N P k= − ⋅ ⋅  (10)
where F  – fine for unfulfilled obligation within 
the framework of a TGCS, EUR, GCFN  – number 
of purchased GCs in the reporting year, units; fk  
– fine coefficient.
In order to count the price of 1 МWh of electricity 
for end consumers (P
CONS
), the following formula 
is proposed: 
( )









= − ⋅ +
+ ⋅ + ⋅
 (11)
The methodological approaches proposed above 
allow for calculating the price for electricity from 
by both owners of RE facilities and end consumers.
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In order to calculate LCOE, the article used da-
ta regarding RE projects, which were implement-
ed in Ukraine during 2015–2017. These data were 
provided by the Ukrainian Renewable Energy 
Association (Baker Tilly, 2015), the Ukrainian 
Wind Energy Association (UWEA, 2016) and the 
engineering company “Rentechno” (Engineering, 
2016). In addition, the recommendations of the 
Ukraine Sustainable Energy Lending Facility 
(USELF) (USELF, 2014) and the International 
Energy Agency (IEA, 2015) were used. The dis-
count rate was calculated based on the average 
weighted cost of capital and the risk premium 
according to Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s for 
2018 (Damodaran, 2018) amounting to 12% in eu-
ro (EUR). It is worth noting that the high discount 
rate is due to the high risk of doing business in 
Ukraine that is largely due to the armed conflict in 
the east of the country. The official exchange rate 
of the National Bank of Ukraine as of February, 1 
2019 (31.8 UAH for 1 EUR) was used for curren-
cy conversion (NBU, 2019). iLCOE  for electricity 
generated on the basis of various RE technologies 
was calculated according to formula (1) and pre-
sented in Table 1.
Table 1. The LCOE and the GC price for different 
types of RE plants in Ukraine 













Solar power plants 188.52 212.81





(landfill biogas) 48.42 37.69
Bioenergy plants (solid 
biomass) 85.19 83.65
Bioenergy plants 
(agricultural biogas) 49.94 39.58
The price of conventional electricity ( )CEP  was 
calculated based on the analysis of electricity 
sale at the Ukrainian wholesale electricity mar-
ket from September 1, 2018 until February 1, 2019. 
The average weighted wholesale price for purchas-
ing conventional electricity during this period was 
22.84 EUR/МWh (WEMU, 2019). 
According to formula (3), the calculated price of 
the GC ( )GCiP  for electricity generated on the ba-
sis of different RES types is presented in Table 1 as 
well. Table 1 shows that the various RE technolo-
gies have different cost. In order to simplify price 
fluctuations during the issuance and circulation of 
GCs, it is proposed to set a single GC price. It is 
reasonable to use the GC price for the cheapest RE 
technology that is bioenergy plants (landfill bio-
gas) at 37,69 EUR/МWh.
Regulation of the electricity cost based on various 
RES types can be performed by issuing different 
quantity of GCs to producers per unit of electricity 
generated. Formulas (4) and (5) were used to calcu-
late the required number of GCs and the renew-
able electricity price per MWh. This calculation 
would have been performed by electricity produc-
ers. The results are depicted in Table 2.
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To test the proposed methodology, the following 
assumptions were made and results achieved:
1. The projected consumption of electricity based 
on the 2018 data is 128.39 TWh (SSSU, 2019). 
2. The renewable electricity consumption re-
quirement (quota) is 2% or 2.57 TWh.
3. The projected amount of electricity generated 
by the operating RE plants covers only 75% of 
the annual RE requirement. In order to meet 
the rest 25%, the NCSREPU issues credit GCs.
4. The electricity amount generated from vari-
ous RES is assumed according to the RES mix 
in Ukraine as of 2018: solar power plants at 
24.2%, wind power plants at 58.3%, small hy-
dropower plants at 12.5%, bioenergy plants 
(solid biomass) at 3%, bioenergy plants (bio-
gas from agricultural waste) at 1%, and bioen-
ergy plants (landfill biogas) at 1% (NCSREPU, 
2019).
5. The structure of the renewable electricity mix 
to be supported by credit GCs is set accord-
ing to the state priorities for RE development 
with solar power plants at 15.3%, wind pow-
er plants at 40.4%, small hydropower plants 
at 25.3%, bioenergy plants (solid biomass) at 
8%, bioenergy plants (biogas from agricultur-
al waste) at 4%, and bioenergy plants (landfill 
biogas) at 7%.
6. The amount of the electricity purchased by the 
energy supply company, for which calculation 
is carried out at the national wholesale elec-
tricity market in the reporting year, is 106.92 
GWh.
7. The energy supply company met 95% of its ob-
ligation to purchase GCs in the reporting year 
having purchased 5,648 certificates.
8. The fine for the unfulfilled obligation is set at 
20% of the GC cost for the electricity generat-
ed on the basis of the cheapest RE technology 
presented on the electricity market.
9. The end consumer, for whom the calcula-
tion is performed, belongs to the category 
that draws more than 100 kWh per month 
per consumer and 300kWh on average per 
month. As of January 2019, the tariffs (rates) 
set by NCSREPU are: 0.02 EUR for 1 kWh of 
electricity (without the value added tax) if the 
consumption is less than 100 kWh per month 
and 0.04 EUR for 1 kWh of electricity if the 
consumption is over 100 kWh per month. 
Thus, per annum, the consumer pays 20 EUR 
per 1 МWh for 1.2 MWh and 40 EUR for 1 
МWh for the rest 2.4 МWh amounting to 120 
EUR (33,33 EUR for 1 МWh) for 3.6 МWh.
Based on the assumptions above, the projected an-
nual amount of electricity generated by operating 
RE plants, the projected annual amount of elec-
tricity generation supported by credit GCs, and 
the average weighted quantity of the certificates 
in circulation in the reporting year are calculated 
according to formula (7) and depicted in Table 3.
The calculation of the total quantity of the certifi-
cates, which would have been in circulation in the 
reporting year, is based on the amount of electricity 
generated from RES, which is difficult to estimate 
with certainty. Therefore, the NCSREPU has to use 
a lower estimate of the projected amount of electric-
ity generated by the operating RE plants, as well as 
Table 2. Number of GCs that producers of electricity from different types of RES would have obtained 
per 1 MWh and cost of electricity generation from RES 
Types of RE plants
Number of GCs that producers of 




Cost of electricity generation from RES 





Solar power plants 5.65 235.65
Wind power plants 2.03 99.30
Small hydropower plants 1.95 96.26
Bioenergy plants (landfill biogas) 1.00 60.53
Bioenergy plants (solid biomass) 2.23 106.49
Bioenergy plants (agricultural biogas) 1.05 62.42
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the amount of electricity supported via credit GCs. 
If the actual generation data varies from the pro-
jections, the NCSREPU will balance the deviation 
through issuing credit GCs at the end of the year.
Assuming that the energy supply company, for 
which calculation is carried out, purchased 
106,920 МWh per year at the wholesale electricity 
market, the number of GCs necessary to meet ob-
ligations to purchase electricity from RES accord-
ing to the 2% requirement (quota) is calculated 
through formula (8) and amounts to 5,945 units. 
Therefore, the energy supply company has fulfilled 
95% of its GC purchase obligation having bought 
5,648 certificates. In addition, applying formula 
(10), the fine, which is to be paid for the unfulfilled 
obligation, is 13432,72 EUR.
According to the assumptions above and formula 
(11), price of 1 МWh for end consumers within a 
TGCS is 35,43 EUR/МWh. It is higher than the 
current tariff for the mentioned consumers of elec-
tricity by 6%. Thus, a 1% increase in the quota for 
consumption of green electricity will lead to the 
tariff growth by 3% that will not be a significant 
financial burden for end electricity consumers. 
CONCLUSION 
The proposed TGCS is a new policy mechanism to promote RE development in Ukraine. Implementing 
a TGCS likely faces a number of challenges, some of which are outlined throughout this article. However, 
a thoughtful design based on a thorough evaluation of important criteria, such as pricing and competi-
tive environment formation, can result in an effective policy supporting the development of the budding 
RE sector in Ukraine.
The results show that an introduction of a requirement (quota) for green electricity consumption will 
result in a 3% increase in the electricity tariff (rate) for end consumers. This increase is insignificant, es-
pecially given more than doubling of electricity prices during the last few years in Ukraine. In addition, 
to soften the financial burden for end consumers in the short term, the government could support the 
development of the cheapest RE technologies with the help of credit GCs. In the long term, a significant 
increase in electricity tariffs (rates) with expansion of the requirement (quota) is not anticipated because 
of the ever-declining LCOE of RE. 
Furthermore, in order to implement the proposed TGSC effectively, deployment of RE facilities must 
be supplemented by sweeping energy efficiency and demand side management measures. Fluctuations 
of the renewable electricity share in the total electricity mix depend not only on the amount of elec-
tricity generated from RES but also directly on the amount of its consumption in the reporting period. 
Therefore, taking such measures is important as it increases the overall success of policies aimed at rapid 
RE development with the help of a TGCS.
Table 3. Projected annual amount of electricity generation by the operating RE plants; projected 
annual amount of electricity generation supported by credit GCs; and the average weighted number 
of certificates in circulation in the reporting year 
Types of RE plants
Projected annual amount of 
electricity generated from RES, MWh
Total number of 
the certificates in 




number of certificates 










Solar power plants 466,046.02 98,216.82 3,128,995
2.78
Wind power plants 1,122,747.23 259,343.76 2,853,354
Small hydropower plants 240,726.25 162,410.82 785,791
Bioenergy plants (landfill biogas) 19,258.10 44,935.80 64,194
Bioenergy plants (solid biomass) 57,774.30 51,355.20 251,166
Bioenergy plants (agriculture biogas) 19,258.10 25,677.60 48,065
Total 1,925,810 641,940 7,131,566
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